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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated terrorist
attacks began to unfold in Paris and its northern suburb of Saint-Denis.
Beginning at 9:20 PM, three suicide bombers struck near the Stade de
France in Saint-Denis, where thousands of people had filled the stadium
* George Mason University, B.A., 2012; American University Washington College of
Law, J.D., 2017. I am thankful to the countless professors that have encouraged and challenged
me throughout my academic career and to my colleague Erendida Orellana for her valuable
comments and review throughout the writing of this Article. Above all, I am grateful to my
parents, Mohammad and Karolin El-Rashed, whose unending support, sacrifice, and generosity
are the foundation of all that I achieve.
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to watch a soccer match. Shortly thereafter, further attacks followed
throughout the city, including suicide bombings and mass shootings at
cafes and restaurants in the vicinity of the rue Albert, the rue de la
Fontaine-au-Roi, the rue de Charonne, and avenue de la R~publique. At
the Bataclan theatre, a music venue in central Paris, attackers opened fire
upon concert-goers before taking hostages and engaging in a stand-off
with the police which ended upon the shooters detonating their suicide
vests.1 At the end of the night's horrific events, the attackers had killed
130 people2 and injured 352, marking the single greatest attack on French
soil since World War 11.
3
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility
for the attacks, saying that it was in retaliation for the French airstrikes
on ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq.4 All of the known Paris attackers were
EU citizens, allowing them to travel freely across borders.5 Some,
including the alleged leader, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, were among the
estimated 5,000-6,000 EU citizens-a majority of which are French
nationals-who have traveled to Syria and joined ISIL and other radical
groups, and which pose a significant threat upon their return to their home
communities in Europe.7 The attack on Paris was the first of which many
fear to be a series of planned attacks by ISIL on cities throughout the
western world.
Immediately following the November 13 attack, French President
Francoise Hollande declared a 12-day state of emergency across the
nation,8 which was then repeatedly extended for a period of nearly two
1. Steve Almasy, Pierre Meilhan & Jim Bittermann, Paris Massacre: At least 128 killed
in gunfire and blasts, French officials say, CNN NEWS (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/
2015/11/13 /world/paris-shooting/index.html.
2. Anealla Safdar, France state of emergency 'extended on slim evidence', AL JAZEERA
(Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/0 2/france-state-emergency-extended-
slim-evidence- 160217174759408.html.
3. Mariano Castillo, Paris suicide bomber identified; ISIS claims responsibility for 129
dead, CNN NEWS (Nov. 16, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/1 /14/world/paris-attacks/.
4. Id.
5. Ian Traynor, EU ministers order tighter border checks in response to Paris attacks, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/eu-ministers-order-
tighter-border-checks-in-response-to-paris-attacks.
6. Lara Marlowe, Abdelhamid Abaaoud: The brains behind the slaughter, IRISH TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/abdelhamid-abaaoud-the-
brains-behind-the-slaughter- 1.2 435358?mode=amp.
7. Up to 6,000 Europeans joined ISIS in Syria- EU, RT WORLD NEWS (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.rt.com/news/249261 -europeans-isis-syria-commissioner/.
8. Anealla Safdar, France state of emergency 'extended on slim evidence', AL JAZEERA
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years before being permanently adopted, in part, into domestic law.
9 The
declared state of emergency is an exceptional regime which grants the
French authorities the capacity to circumvent, to a limited extent,
domestic and international human rights laws as it deems necessary to
more effectively protect national security in this time of exceptional
circumstance. The declaration of a state of emergency, however, does not
offer the French government a carte blanche to commit human rights
abuses. 
10
Acts of terrorism undoubtedly strike at the core of human rights and
offend the value of human dignity by denying its victims their humanity.
As such, France, and other states in its position, not only have the right,
but also the duty, to take measures in countering terrorism and protecting
their citizens' most fundamental human rights. International human rights
law recognizes that in order to perform its duty and protect its citizens,
governments must have the ability to impose certain limitations on
people's rights. This power of the state to impose limitations is reflected
in the general principles of limitation which are applied in peacetime, as
well as in Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), which grant even greater powers of limitation in times
of emergency by allowing the state to derogate from certain obligations
it otherwise carries.
1"
The emergency measures which a state may take in the context of a
derogation are strictly limited however, and must only be resorted to
where the ordinary limiting powers of the state are inadequate in meeting
the needs which the emergency presents.'
2 Furthermore, there are a
number of conditions which must be satisfied in order for the state to
invoke its exceptional limiting powers reserved for extreme
circumstances. First and foremost, the government bears the burden of
proving the existence of a public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation-a threshold not easily met.'
3 Second, the derogation must be
limited in its scope and effect. Emergency measures may limit people's
rights only to the extent that is strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation so as to ensure that all actions taken fall within the confines of
that which is permitted with respect to principles of proportionality,
9. Christian Hartmann, Two years after the Paris attacks, France ends state of emergency,
Reuters (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-security/two-years-after-the-
paris-attacks-france-ends-state-of-emergency-idU SKBNI DI4KD.
10. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPRI; see European Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Apr. 11,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
11. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4; see ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15.
12. Fact Sheet No. 32, Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, at 26 (2008),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Factsheet32EN.pdf [hereinafter The Factsheet].
13. Id.
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necessity, legality and equal application. 14 The state must also ensure that
each action taken under the premise of the state of emergency furthers the
aim pursued and is not applied in a discriminatory manner. 15
Although it is certainly the duty and right of the French authorities to
exercise all powers at its disposal in protecting the life and welfare of the
nation, there are limitations which exist to safeguard against abuse by the
state and degradation of individual rights. France has overstepped these
limitations and gone beyond that which is prescribed in determining the
scope of a valid derogation, thus undermining the rule of law and its
commitment to upholding the universality of fundamental human rights.
Its actions taken under the pretense of protecting national security-more
specifically, to "protect against future attacks"--have not been
appropriately tailored to achieve their aim and have instead been applied
in an overbroad and discriminatory manner.
As a result, the French authorities are further marginalizing the
Muslim community at a time when ensuring their trust and cooperation
with the authorities and a feeling of inclusivity is of most importance in
combatting the growing threat of domestic terrorist involvement. The
measures taken since the declared state of emergency are not only illegal
with respect to international human rights law, they are exposing the
sector of society already most at risk of radicalization to the sort of
environment in which it most easily flourishes, thus undermining
altogether that which France claims to be the aim of its derogation.16
1. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND ITS LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
At the core of international human rights law is the intent to ensure a
basic level of protection of rights for all human beings, everywhere, at all
times. It is held that the protection of basic human rights is fundamental
to the existence of international peace and security and the absence of its
universality poses the threat of instability for all. ' 7 Among those rights
considered fundamental are the rights to life, liberty and security, and
freedom of expression and religion, as well as other social, cultural and
economic rights. '
8
In its protectoral role, it is the inherent responsibility of the state to
maintain peace and security within its jurisdiction and to, therefore, take
all measures necessary to ensure the basic rights of all of its constituents.
14. Id. at 29.
15. Id.
16. Amnesty Int'l, Upturned Lives, The Disproportionate Impact of France's State of
Emergency, Al Index EUR 21/3364/2016 (Feb. 4, 2016).
17. UN Charter art. 1, 1.
18. See HELEN DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEwoRK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 274 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2015).
[Vol. 30
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States are obliged to protect both citizens and aliens within its jurisdiction
alike. 19 This is a responsibility which manifests in both negative and
positive obligations. Positive obligations entail the state's obligation to
take action to protect against rights violations. Negative obligations entail
the state's obligation to refrain from implementing any policies or taking
any actions which may undermine the free enjoyment 
of basic rights. 20
Human rights, and the obligations of the state thereto, are grounded in
international and regional treaties which stem from the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.21 Upon ratifying these treaties, states have
legally bound themselves to the recognition of fundamental human rights
and the obligation to ensure their protection for all. One of the first to
emerge, and one of the most widely ratified treaties, is the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which commits its
parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the
right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, and the rights to due process and a fair trial.
22 Among the states
of the Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) is another treaty whose mandatory ratification is central to a
public and binding commitment to uphold a legal standard for the
protection of human rights.23 The United Nations charter is also
considered a binding human rights instrument upon its 193 member states
as by joining the UN, states undertake a commitment to the UN's stated
purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedom for all.",24 Furthermore, all UN member states are
ipso acto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
which establishes the International Court of Justice, the principal legal
organ of the United Nations.25  Binding treaty provisions are
supplemented by "soft-law" standards of human rights contained in
resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly or other international or
regional bodies.26 In ratifying each of these instruments, France has
undertaken to observe and protect the fundamental principles and rights
outlined therein.
Furthermore, regardless of whether a state has ratified the relevant
human rights treaties, it is not immune of its duties towards respecting
19. Id. at 289; see ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2, 1.
20. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 274.
21. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION:
REPORT OF THE EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 18 (2009) [hereinafter ASSESSING DAMAGE].
22. See ICCPR, supra note 10 (the ICCPR has a total of 170 state parties, of which, France
is included).
23. See ECH4R, supra note 10.
24. U.N Charter art. 1, 3.
25. U.N Charter art. 93, 1.
26. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 459.
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and ensuring human rights protections, as even non-party states are bound
by the human rights standards of customary international law. Customary
law generally refers to those norms whose practice is "extensive and
virtually uniform" and opiniojuris, or "accepted as law.' ,27 However, in
the case of international human rights law, it is suggested that the
existence of "extensive and virtually uniform" practice is not as decisive
in determining norms of customary law and rather, a greater emphasis is
placed upon opiniojuris, as expressed by international organizations and
reflected through treaty ratification.28 Some customary norms are
afforded the heightened status of jus cogens, meaning they are
peremptory rights which cannot be deviated from under any
circumstances and which do not change with shifting state practices as do
other customary norms.29 Instead,jus cogens can only ever be overwritten
with the replacement of another jus cogens in its place.30 Simply put,
customary norms are generally accepted, self-executing legal norms
which all states are subject to.
As many states have assumed human rights obligations through
international and regional treaties, customary norms rarely form an area
of contention, and rather serve to further underscore the universality of
those obligations.31 The importance of their delineation arises, however,
in the context of a derogation from treaty obligations. Unlike many of the
obligations a state incurs via treaty ratification, customary norms are
considered to be peremptory and non-derogable.32 Given the informal
nature of customary law, different human rights bodies vary in which
rights they consider to have the status of customary, and therefore, non-
derogable, law. More restrictive lists regard non-derogable customary
law to encompass only the non-derogable rights common to the three
major human rights treaties, while others suggest hat the non-derogable
rights listed in Article 4 of the ICCPR reflect a more accurate list.33 The
Human Rights Committee has stated however, that the provisions of the
covenant listed in Article 4 as non-derogable are not meant to reflect a
27. Id. at 460; Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 1, June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 933.
28. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 460-61 (noting how, although certain human rights abuses,
like torture, may be practiced daily in various countries, that does not preclude a right to freedom
from those abuses from customary law as regardless of practice, they are universally regarded as
unlawful).
29. Id. at 461 n.23.
30. Id. at 461.
31. Id. at460-61.
32. BEHNAm RASTEGARI, VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES IN COUNTER-TERRORISM
MEASURES 45 (Lulu 2014).
33. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 462 (including the right to life, freedom from torture and
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complete list of those rights which are fundamental and peremptory.
34
Nonetheless, among those most commonly noted, are the obligations to
observe the basic rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict, the right to
life, and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, the rights to freedom from
collective punishment, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, slavery, racial
discrimination, genocide, apartheid, torture, and crimes against humanity
are considered among those customary norms from which a state may
never derogate.35 Accordingly, these are norms which France must
uphold regardless of the circumstances which it currently faces, no matter
how dire.
To simply recognize the importance of norms of international human
rights on the global stage while failing to uphold them in practice, albeit
in a state of emergency, would undermine their substantive value and the
commitments which states have undertaken via treaty ratification and
customary law. Thus, supplementary to the norms of international human
rights are a series of enforcement mechanisms which serve to ensure that
countries, like France, regard fundamental human rights with more than
just a nominal nature and, instead, ensure their implementation.
Among these enforcement mechanisms are a series of treaty bodies,
which oversee a particular international or regional treaty. Each treaty
body monitors the application of the relevant treaty in each state party
and offers judicial oversight and authoritative interpretation of specific
provisions of the treaty.36 For example, the implementation of the ICCPR
is monitored by the Human Rights Committee, a 
UN treaty body.37
Decisions issued by treaty bodies are generally considered non-binding,
although non-compliance may be considered a breach of obligations,-
under the treaty.38 States which are party to the ECHR, however, are
legally obligated to follow decisions issued by the European Court of
Human Rights, its overseeing treaty body.39
In addition to the advisory role that treaty bodies fulfill, they also
provide a mechanism by which individuals may bring forward complaints
34. U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations
During a State of Emergency, 6, U.N. Doc. A/CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.] 1 (2001) [hereinafter
General Comment No. 29] (stating the fact that some provisions of the covenant have been listed
in Article 4 as non-derogable does not mean that other articles in the covenant may be subjected
to derogations at will, even where a threat to the life of the nation exists); ICCPR, supra note 10,
2 ("[T]here shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights
recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions,
regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or
that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.").
35. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 462.
36. Id. at 262-63.
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against the state party alleging violations of its obligations under the
treaty and by which victims may seek redress.40 The United Nations
Commission on Human Rights also monitors the observance of human
rights outside the context of ratification of a particular treaty via the
commission of various working groups and Special Rapporteurs which
investigate and report upon specific subjects, such as torture.4'
II. FLEXIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
AND LIMITING POWER OF THE STATE
The human rights framework generally aims to promote above all,
human dignity. Each right is designed to protect the individual from
intrusions, by the state or otherwise, which offend the concept of such
dignity.42 However, that is not to say that all human rights are absolute.
There can be, and there often must be, limitations which are implemented
in order to more effectively preserve the standard of dignity for the
society as a whole.43 In such cases, the state may, subject to certain
limitations, impose restrictions upon individual freedoms where it is
necessary to balance the competing rights of individuals and protect
public order.
44
For example, while the international human rights law framework
recognizes the right to free expression as one that is undoubtedly crucial
to the enjoyment of political and cultural freedom, it is not one which
must go unfettered.4 5 Though states are required to respect and protect
the right, they may limit it to the extent necessary to prevent one's
enjoyment of the freedom of expression from infringing on the rights of
another, or where necessary to preserve public order, national security,
public health or morals.46 With this in mind, it is made clear why there is
no right to engage in speech which may incite hate, as doing so would
undoubtedly create an intrusion upon the right of others to live in dignity,
which the state is equally obligated to protect. Similarly, the state may
proscribe one's freedom of expression to the extent that it promotes or
incites terrorism, an obvious risk to the good of the society as a whole.47
40. Id. (in order for a state to be made liable to individual complaints brought before the
treaty body, the state must have availed itself of the jurisdiction of the treaty body).
41. See id. at 263-65.
42. ASSESSING DAMAGE, supra note 21, at 16; see generally G.A. Res. 217 (111) A,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("[AIII human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.").
43. ASSESSING DAMAGE, supra note 21, at 19 ("[Fjundamental principles such as the
freedom of movement, of expression, and of association, must be protected by law, but are also
subject to restrictions in accommodation of individuals with competing interests.").
44. See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 275.
45. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19.
46. Id.
47. See id.; The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 25.
[Vol. 30
8
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol30/iss1/1
FLIGHT OF THE CONDORS
Such a balance of interests is the hallmark of any democratic society and
one which the international legal framework accounts for in its inherent
flexibility.
Furthermore, the international human rights framework is equipped to
apply at all times, in any context, as it not only allows for limitations on
certain rights in the context of peacetime, but in a very limited set of
exceptional circumstances, it allows states an even greater breadth of
limiting power by permitting the state to derogate from certain human
rights provisions without violating their obligations under the human
rights conventions.48 It accounts and accommodates for the fact that in
times of serious public emergency, an even broader range of restrictions
on rights may be needed in order for the state to effectively fulfill its role
in protecting the public good.49 Absent such extreme circumstances,
however, the authority of the state is restricted and subject to the general
principles which govern state powers of limitation and interference.
The guidelines used to evaluate the legitimacy of state measures
restricting the enjoyment of rights and freedoms are drawn from Article
29 of the IJDHR, as well as the subsequent standards which emerged
therefrom.50 In the years since the passing of the UDHR, extensive
jurisprudence at a national, regional and international level has come to
recognize that rights may be justifiably limited where the restrictions
serve a legitimate purpose, are non-discriminatory, and comply with the
principles of necessity, proportionality, and legality.
5' Provided it
maintains observance of the these guidelines, the state may lawfully limit
certain rights, including "the right to freedom of expression, the right to
freedom of association and assembly, the right to freedom of movement
and the right to respect for one's private and family life," even in times
of peace. 
52
A. Legitimate Slate Purpose
First and foremost, all restrictions upon the free enjoyment of rights
and freedoms must serve a legitimate state purpose in order to comply
with international human rights law.53 This principle serves to limit the
state from arbitrarily depriving individuals of their rights, and thereby
48. The guidelines which govern the validity of a derogation are discussed with greater
specificity in the next section.
49. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 275.
50. UDHR, supra note 42, art. 29 ("[E]veryone has duties to the community" and "everyone
shall be subject to limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare.").
51. RASTEGARI, supra note 32, at 49; ASSESSING DAMAGE, supra note 21, at 19; The
Factsheet, supra note 12, at 23.
52. The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 23.
53. Id. at 24.
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violating its obligations under the relevant human rights treaties. Though
permissible aims vary depending on the particular human right and
relevant treaty in question, laws which limit individual rights are
generally acceptable where they legitimately serve the interests of
national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public
health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.54
A legitimate purpose must be named as the law can only prohibit forms
of behavior that harm society.
55
B. Legality
The principle of legality is a reflection of the maxim of nullum crimen
sine lege-no crime without law-and is a fundamental aspect of human
rights law and the rule of law in general. Its absolute and non-derogable
nature has been explicitly recognized by a number of human rights
treaties and international human rights bodies.56 It is closely linked with
the right to "security of person"57 as it "safeguards people's right to know
which acts will result in criminal liability and which will not,,58 thus
protecting against an overreaching or arbitrary exercise of power on
behalf of the state. 59 The principle of legality demands that all limitations
on rights and freedoms, particularly in the context of proscribing that
which has been deemed a "criminal" offense, be prescribed by law. 60
54. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19 (stating that the freedom of opinion and
expression may be limited where "provided by law and necessary for the respect of the rights or
reputations of others, [or] for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public
health or morals."); Id. art. 21 (stating that the right to assembly may be limited where provided
by law and necessary "in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.");
ECHR, supra note 10, art. 8 (stating that there shall be no state interference with the right to
privacy except where prescribed by law and necessary in the interests of "national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.").
55. International Commission of Jurists, LEGAL COMMENTARY TO THE ICJ BERLIN
DECLARATION: COUNTER-TERRORISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 19 (2008)
[hereinafter ICJ COMMENTARY].
56. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15; League of Arab States,
Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 4, Sept. 15, 1994, 12 I.H.R.R. 893; Organization of American
States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 20, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
UDHR, supra note 42, art. 11; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 49, 2000 J.O. (C 364) 1;
General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, at 7.
57. UDHR, supra note 42, art. 3.
58. ICJ COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 16.
59. ELECTRONIC FRONT IR FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE 14 (2001) http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pd£
60. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 335, 336 (2005); The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 23.
[Vol. 30
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Furthermore, it demands that any criminal conviction resultant of such
law comply with the principles of non-retroactivity and individual
criminal responsibility.6 Together, these two components of the
principle of legality provide for fair notice and fair adjudication in
criminal law.
62
In order for a criminal offense to be considered "prescribed by law,"
the principle of legality requires that criminal legislation be drafted with
a sufficient level of precision and be made publicly accessible so that each
individual may have an adequate opportunity to regulate his or her own
behavior so as to remain within accordance of the law.
63 The specific type
of conduct, whether by act or omission, which the criminal law seeks to
limit must be clearly described, and its elements established.
64
Definitions which are vague, ambiguous, and imprecise violate the
principal of legality and constitute a breach of international human rights
law and the "the general conditions prescribed by international law."
65 As
seen in much of the counter-terrorism legislation which has passed
worldwide since 2001,66 over-broad and vague wording in the law fails
to give people adequate notice of what conduct may subject them to
criminal liability and opens the door to arbitrary and discriminatory
61. See ECHR, supra note 10, art. 8-11; ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 12, 17-19, 21, and 22;
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACFIR), art. 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16; The
Factsheet, supra note 12, at 23; ICJ COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 16; Robinson, supra note 60,
at 349.
62. See Robinson, supra note 60, at 336-37.
63. The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 24.
64. David Michael Nicholas v. Australia, Comm. No. 1080/2002, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/80/D/1080/2002, 7.5 (Mar. 19, 2004) ("[W]hether a particular act or omission gives
rise to a conviction for a criminal [offense] is not an issue which can be determined in the abstract;
rather, this question can only be answered after a trial pursuant to which evidence is adduced to
demonstrate that the elements of the [offense] have been proven to the necessary standard. If a
necessary element of the [offense], as described in national (or international) law, cannot be
properly proven to have existed, then it follows that a conviction of a person for the act or omission
in question would violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, and the principle of 
legal
certainty, provided by Article 15, paragraph 1.").
65. ICJ COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 17.
66. Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide
Since September 11, (June 29, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report2012/06/29/name-
security/counterterrorism-laws-worldwide-september- II [hereinafter In the Name of Security],
(fimding that "more than 130 domestic counterterrorism laws included one or more vague terms
such as 'public order' without properly defining them. More than half of those laws included 
at
least two ambiguous definitions, and five failed to identify what constituted a terrorist act at all.").
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enforcement6 7-- often against religious or ethnic communities, political
parties, or other particular groups.68
The principle of legality holds that in order for an individual to be held
accountable for a crime, they must have fully committed the criminal
behavior in question as described precisely and unambiguously in
criminal legislation. This necessarily precludes any court from engaging
in lax interpretation of criminal law and imposition, by analogy, of"criminal punishment for conduct not provided for.",69 Furthermore, it
prevents any court from convicting anyone except on the basis of that
which they have personally done.70 Thus, where merely belonging to a
group is an ipso facto offense, regardless of whether the individual
concerned has knowledge of, has participated in, or contributed towards
the commission of a crime, it is a violation of the fundamental,
peremptory norm of international law that criminal responsibility is to be
assessed on an individual, personal level and there can be no collective
punishment.
71
Finally, the principle of legality requires that adjudication of a
criminal offense must also comply with the principle of non-
retroactivity.72 This principle is best explained in Article 15 of the
ICCPR, which states that "no one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed.73 Moreover, a heavier penalty than the one that was
applicable at the time when the criminal offense was committed may not
67. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, para. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser. C) No. 59, 121 (May 30, 1999) ("Ambiguity in describing crimes creates
doubts and the opportunity for abuse of power, particularly when it comes to ascertaining the
criminal responsibility of individuals and punishing their criminal behavior with penalties that
exact their toll on the things that are most precious, such as life and liberty.").
68. U.N High Comm'r for Refugees, Note on International Protection, 39, UN Doc.
A/AC.96/965 (Sept. 11, 2002) (expressing concern with ambiguities in much of international and
domestic anti-terrorism legislation and stating that "if definitions are too broad and vague.. there
is a risk that the 'terrorist' label might be abused for political ends, for example to criminalize
legitimate activities of political opponents, in a manner amounting to persecution."); In the Name
of Security, supra note 66 ("In Australia, for example, community lawyers and civil society groups
have reported that ambiguous terminology in counterterrorism legislation has resulted in the
disproportionate use of counterterrorism measures against Muslim, Kurdish, Tamil, and Somali
communities.").
69. ICJ COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 18.
70. Guzzardi v. Italy, Appi no. 7367/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 333, 386 (1980) (stating that
authorities may not arrest someone whom they believe may have committed an offense solely on
the grounds that he or she belongs to a group of individuals who are considered dangerous because
of their propensity to crime).
71. ICJ COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 21-22.
72. The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 24.
73. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 15.
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be imposed, and if, subsequent to the commission of the offense, the law
provides for a lighter penalty, the offender should 
benefit therefrom.74
C. Necessity and Proportionality
Furthermore, not only must the state demonstrate that its limitations
on a person's rights serve a legitimate purpose, it must also establish that
its interference conforms to the principles of proportionality and
necessity. In other words, it must establish that it is "necessary in a
democratic society" and proportionate to achieving the aim sought.
75 The
Human Rights Committee interprets this to mean that in order for
restrictive measures to conform to the principles of proportionality and
necessity, they must be "appropriate" in achieving their protective
function and must be the least intrusive means by which the desired result
may be achieved.76
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has offered its own
opinion in trying to define "necessary," holding that the term is not
synonymous with, or as rigid as, "indispensable," nor as flexible as the
terms "admissible," "ordinary," "useful," "reasonable," or "desirable."
77.
With no clear definition in mind, the European Court seeks to assess the
necessity and proportionality of a measure with a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach subject to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine.78
Courts in several states have clarified that "appropriateness" does not
necessarily mean that the measures taken have to be entirely successful.
Instead, they impose a requirement similar to the Canadian concept of
"rationally connected," meaning the measure must not only have some
logical link to its intended objective, but should also be "effective" at
achieving it.79 A measure which is inherently incapable of achieving the
stated objective, or which is demonstrably grossly ineffective in
achieving it, cannot ever be considered "appropriate," "necessary," or
"proportionate." 80
III. LIMITING POWER OF THE STATE IN AN EMERGENCY:
DOCTRINE OF DEROGATION
In addition to the limitations which states may impose upon certain
individual freedoms in times of peace, the flexibility of the international
human rights framework affords the state an even greater degree of
74. The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 24.
75. Id. at 24; ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 1.
76. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12: Freedom
of Movement, 14, U.N. Doc. A/CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
77. Handyside v. the United Kingdom, App no. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 734.
78. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 20.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id. at 4.
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interference in times of emergency. In very limited circumstances, and
under strict guidelines, states may temporarily derogate from their
obligations under international human rights treaties where doing so
serves to preserve the full function of the democratic society in the face
of extreme danger. Both the ECHR and the ICCPR contemplate the
state's need in such cases to be able to act promptly and effectively in the
best interest of the society as a whole. Thus, both human rights
instruments explicitly provide the state with the right to derogate in the
case of a public emergency.81 Though the state cannot derogate from the
treaty entirely, it may temporarily suspend its obligations to respect and
enforce specific rights, and may implement measures that interfere with
the enjoyment of rights otherwise protected by these instruments.
The underlying purpose of including a derogation provision in the
ICCPR and ECHR is to provide states the necessary latitude to protect
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the enjoyment of basic
freedoms during a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.82
Such flexibility is necessary to balancing the most vital needs of the state
in times of crisis while also providing the strongest human rights
protections possible, thus ensuring the continued applicability of the
human rights framework.3 As such, even in the most serious
emergencies, there still remain rights which are non-derogable on the
grounds that they are inherently too fundamental to ever be infringed
upon, and there subsequently exists no justifiable state objective to be
sought in their curtailment.84 These absolute rights include "non-
derogable" rights enumerated within the derogation clauses themselves,85
as well as those rights which are considered unconditional, preemptory
81. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15 (outlining the formal
and substantive requirements which a state party must fulfill in order to derogate legitimately from
certain obligations under the covenant).
82. Robert Goldman (Independent Expert), Report of the Independent Expert on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 12, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2205/103 (Feb. 17, 2005) (stating that as the "underlying purpose of such measures
is to protect democratic institutions, the rule of law and enjoyment of basic freedoms, such
measures cannot lawfully be undertaken to weaken or destroy them.").
83. CHRISTOPHER MICHAELSEN, DEROGATING FROM INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS IN THE 'WAR AGAINST TERRORISM?-A BRITISH-AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE, 138
(Taylor & Francis ed., 2008).
84. ASSESSING DAMAGE, supra note 21, at 20.
85. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4 (identifying the following rights as non-derogable: the
right to life, the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfill a
contractual debt, the prohibition of retroactive laws, the recognition of everyone as a person before
the law, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion); ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15
(identifying the following rights as non-derogable: the right to life (except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war), the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of torture, and the
right to protection from punishment without law).
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norms of customary international law and international humanitarian
law.86 For example, the Human Rights Committee has stressed the
importance of the fundamental principles of legality and rule of law,
including the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence; and
has identified them as non-derogable preemptory rights as there is no
conceivable circumstance in which any of these rights could be justifiably
denied for the good of another individual or the good of society.
87
Additionally, there are a number of other substantive and procedural
legal requirements which must be fulfilled in order to establish the
validity of a derogation. In order to invoke its exceptional powers under
the ICCPR and ECHR, the derogating government must first establish the
existence of a "public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation."88
Second, the state must officially proclaim a state of emergency and notify
relevant treaty bodies.89 Third, measures derogating from any obligation
under the treaty must be limited to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.90 And finally, the state must ensure that all
measures taken are non-discriminatory and consistent with all of the
state's other obligations under international law.
91
A. Existence of a Public Emergency
Not every catastrophe or disturbance qualifies as a public emergency
which "threatens the life of a nation," as this is a classification which is
reserved for only truly exceptional circumstances.
92 Both the ICCPR and
ECHR fail to explicitly define what constitutes a public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and instead leave this to be determined on
a case-by-case basis. However, the European Court of Human Rights
finds that this threshold has generally been met where a public emergency
is actual or imminent, afflicts the whole population, threatens the
86. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 13 (the Human Rights Committee has
identified the following provisions of the ICCPR as non-derogable: the humane treatment of
persons deprived of liberty; the prohibition of hostage-taking, abductions, or unacknowledged
detentions; the protection of persons belonging to minorities; the prohibition of unlawful
deportation or transfer of populations; propaganda for war, or advocacy or national, racial, or
religious hatred that would constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence; the right
to an effective remedy and to challenge the lawfulness of detention); U.N. Human Rights
Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), I,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/94ab9690ccdSlfc (identifying the right to life as a "the
supreme right from which no derogation can be made, even in time of a public emergency.").
87. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 16.
88. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15.
89. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4.
90. Id.; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15.
91. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15.
92. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 3 (even in some cases of armed conflict, the
circumstances do not amount to that which "threatens the life of the nation" and the rules of
international humanitarian law are considered an adequate resource).
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continuance of the organized life of the community, and is of such an
exceptional nature that measures or restrictions normally permitted for
the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly
inadequate.93 Short of such extreme circumstances, states must rely on
their domestic legislative powers and must fully comply with their
international human rights obligations and the standards of limiting
power available to the state in times of peace.94
The burden of proof in establishing these criteria falls upon the state
seeking to derogate from its obligations.95 Although the European Court
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee differ in the level of
discretion which they leave to the state, they each afford the state a
margin of appreciation in assessing whether the circumstances before it
adequately satisfy this standard. In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights discussed the importance of the fact
that in cases of a national emergency, national authorities are far more
aware of the issues on the ground than an international judge and are
therefore better equipped to assess the situation. The court subsequently
held that it falls principally within the responsibility of the state to
determine whether it is confronted with a public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation, establishing a wide margin of appreciation
in making Article 15 determinations.96 The Human Rights Committee,
however, has less faith in the capabilities of the state in determining for
itself whether the circumstances before it amount to a public emergency
sufficient in severity to invoke a derogation under the Covenant. The
Committee has expressed concern on a number of occasions regarding
states which it believes appear to have derogated from rights under the
covenant, or whose domestic law appears to allow such derogation in
situations which do not amount to a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation.
97
B. Procedural Requirements: Proclamation and Notification
After having established that a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation exists, a state wishing to lawfully derogate must then
officially proclaim a state of emergency. In order to comply with the
Article 4 ICCPR provisions regarding this requirement, the derogating
93. MICHAELSEN, supra note 83, at 138-39 (because many provisions of the ICCPR and the
ECHR are so similar-the derogation clauses, in particular-findings of the European Court of
Human Rights are persuasive in interpreting ICCPR cases).
94. The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 26.
95. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 5 (state parties must "provide careful
justification not only for their decision to proclaim a state of emergency but also for any specific
measures based on such a proclamation."); ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15.
96. MICHAELSEN, supra note 83, at 139.
97. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 3.
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state must, through an intermediary of the U.N. Secretary-General,
inform other states party to the Covenant of the provisions from which it
has derogated and the reasons it has done so.
98 Furthermore, the Human
Rights Committee requires that states "must act within their
constitutional and other provisions of law that govern such proclamation
and the exercise of emergency powers." As explained by the Committee
in its General Comment 29, this requirement is essential for the
maintenance of the principles of legality and rule of law "at a time when
they are most needed."99 Failure to comply with this requirement carries
a legal effect and constitutes a violation of international 
law.100
C. Permissible Extent of Derogation Measures: Strictly Required
by the Exigencies of the Situation
Even where a threat to the nation exists, states seeking to derogate
from provisions of the treaty may not freely dispense of their human
rights obligations. Derogation measures must only interfere with the
exercise of rights "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation."'0 ' This requirement pertains to the duration, geographical
coverage, and material scope of the state of emergency and any measures
taken pursuant o it. Furthermore, it reflects the importance of respecting
the fundamental principles of proportionality and necessity while
imposing limitations on individual freedoms.
10 2
In order to satisfy this standard, derogation measures must, first and
foremost, be "necessary" in the sense that powers of limitation available
to the state under ordinary laws and in compliance with its international
human rights obligations are insufficient to meet the needs 
of the state.1 3
For example, in the case of a natural disaster, a state which has established
a valid public emergency may seek to temporarily limit the freedom of
movement in order to ensure public order. However, a derogation from
these provisions-would not be considered necessary as the state already
has the power to restrict the freedom of movement in such circumstances
under Article 12(3) of the ICCPR.
10 4
98. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4, 3 (further stating that the derogating state must also
inform the same intermediary on the date which it terminates its derogation).
99. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 2.
100. MICHAELSEN, supra note 83, at 140; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 1, I (the ECHR does
not carry a proclamation requirement, however, as ECHR Article 15 requires that derogating
parties comply with all of their other obligations under international law, states which are a party
to both the ICCPR and the ECHR are necessarily bound to comply with the proclamation
requirements of the ICCPR in order to avoid violating its obligations under the ECHR).
101. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4, 1; ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15, 1.
102. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 4.
103. MICHAELSEN, supra note 83, at 140.
104. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 5.
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Second, the measures must be, prima facie, suitable to reduce the
threat or crisis. This does not mean that the measures at issue must be
entirely successful, however, those which are inherently incapable of
achieving their stated objective, or which are demonstrably grossly
ineffective in achieving it, cannot ever be said to be suitable.10 5
Third, the measures must be temporary in nature. According to the
Human Rights Committee, the predominant objective of the state in a
derogation must be the restoration of a state of normalcy where full
respect for the covenant can again be secured. Accordingly, derogation
measures must be lifted as soon as the emergency which warranted their
imposition subsists or can be managed by less intrusive means.10 6 The
temporal limit is of utmost importance as it is extremely difficult to re-
institute human rights protections after they have been lost.' 07
Lastly, the degree to which the derogation measures may deviate from
international human rights standards must be strictly proportionate to the
severity of the threat. In other words, the more important the right being
infringed upon, the closer and stricter the scrutiny will be.'08 Effective
safeguards against abuse of emergency powers must be implemented.
This may include regular review by the legislative and judicial
branches. 109
D. Non-Discrimination
The principle of non-discrimination is a fundamental aspect of
international law and one which is explicitly required in evaluating state
measures under of the derogation clause of the ICCPR." Although
Article 26 and other Covenant provisions related to non-discrimination'11
are not included among the non-derogable provisions provided for under
Article 4(2), the principle of non-discrimination cannot be derogated
from in any circumstances, as evidenced by its explicit mention in the
validity requirements of the derogation clause itself.'12 The requirement
for non-discrimination is not explicitly called for under the Article 15
derogation clause of the ECHR, however its importance is reflected under
the general non-discrimination provision of Article 14.1 13 Furthermore,
discriminatory practices would almost always be considered a violation
105. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 21.
106. Goldman, supra note 82, 12.
107. ASSESSING DAMAGE, supra note 21, at 25.
108. MICHAELSEN, supra note 83, at 140.
109. Id. at 140-41.
110. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4, 1 (derogation measures are permitted where they "do
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social
origin.").
111. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2, 3, 14, 23, 24, 25.
112. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 8.
113. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 14.
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as arbitrarily discriminatory application of derogation measures against
disfavored groups would be extremely difficult for the state to justify as
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.
E. Consistency
Both the ICCPR and ECHR require that all derogation measures
remain consistent with the state's other obligations under international
human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal
law, and customary international law." 4 This provision further ensures
the protections of human rights and freedoms in a state of emergency as
it expands that which the state may not derogate from beyond the
enumerated provisions of the derogation clauses themselves. For
example, although the fundamental principles of legality and rule of law
are not explicitly enumerated among the non-derogable provisions of the
ICCPR and ECHR, the consistency requirement ensures their continued
protection even in a state of emergency, as it requires that derogating
states respect their absolute, non-derogable status under international
customary law. Therefore, in order to remain consistent with all of its
obligations, a derogating state must ensure that procedural safeguards
remain in place at all times, including the existence of an independent and
impartial judiciary, as well as a clear distinction between the judicial and
executive powers.1 15 The UN Secretary General has said that such a
distinction is a key element in a legal framework which protects human
rights as it guarantees the conduct of police and other executive forces
remain consistent with international standards. The European Court of
Human Rights further reflects this same sentiment by stating that respect
for the principle of the separation of powers is essential to a functioning
democracy and cannot ever be called into question.
1 6 Accordingly, any
measures which interfere with the principle of legality and the democratic
safeguards which flow from it, violate international customary law and
would thus, constitute a violation of the consistency standards set forth
by the derogation provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK IN
FRANCE
Following the November, 2015 attacks on Paris, French President
Francois Hollande declared a state of emergency, activating an
emergency law enacted in 1955 during France's war in Algeria.
17 As
114. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 9.
115. The Factsheet, supra note 12, at 27-28.
116. Assessing Damage, supra note 21, at 21.
117. Human Rights Watch, France, Abuses Under State of Emergency (Feb. 3, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/O2/O3/france-abuses-under-state-emergency [hereinafter Abuses
Under State of Emergency].
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required under Article 4 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ECHR,
France thereafter notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
and the UN Secretary General of its declared state of emergency and the
derogations it entailed, specifically noting that the emergency measures
might involve a derogation from France's human rights treaty obligations
with regard to the rights to liberty, freedom of movement and privacy. 18
As a result, the French authorities, mainly the Ministry of Interior and the
police, have acquired a wide range of powers which would otherwise
require prior judicial authorization. They now have the ability to conduct
warrantless searches of homes, businesses, and places of worship, impose
citizens under assigned residence orders, block websites, and ban public
demonstrations. The purported purpose of such measures is to "prevent
further terrorist attacks," however their implementation has raised serious
concerns regarding their impact on human rights and their general
ineffectiveness. 9
Almost immediately after the attacks, authorities began authorizing
sweeping raids across Paris's suburban neighborhoods. Searches often
took place in a violent and abusive manner resulting in great damage to
private property, as well as physical and emotional harm to citizens
involved.120 Under French criminal law, a search of a house or other
premises must be authorized by a search warrant issued by judicial
authorities, however, under the current state of emergency, searches can
be carried out with far less oversight and on grounds which fall far below
the threshold established by domestic criminal law.121 The prefect, a local
representative of the state, is authorized under the derogation measures to
order warrantless searches at any time and in any place where "there are
serious reasons to believe that the place is frequented by a person whose
behavior constitutes a threat to public order and security."'122 Therefore,
search orders signed by prefects have typically been short, vague
documents containing little more than boilerplate references to threats to
118. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 32.
119. Id. at6.
120. Abuses Under State of Emergency, supra note 117 (On Nov. 25, 2015, six police
officers broke into the home of an elderly disabled man of Moroccan origin and broke four of his
teeth before realizing they were in the wrong house. In a raid carried out on Nov. 19, police entered
the wrong home and injured a sleeping 6-year-old girl after firing shots to break down the door.
Six of the seven family members in the home at the time of the raid required psychological
counseling. On Nov. 16, 2015, about 60 police officers carried out a raid on a mosque. Despite
the offers of three separate people to unlock the mosque for them, officers instead broke the door
down. On Nov. 21, 2015, 40 police officers in riot gear stormed a halal restaurant in Paris during
business hours. Though the owner offered to unlock any doors, officers instead smashed doors as
they conducted their search which subsequently resulted in no evidence of any crime.).
121. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 10.
122. Abuses Under State of Emergency, supra note 117.
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pubic order and security."' As a result, many have been subjected to
warrantless searches with little or no evidence that they, or anyone else
on the premises searched, were involved in or had any information
regarding the commission of terrorist acts, or any criminal acts for that
matter. 124
In instituting assigned residence orders, authorities may, on similarly
shaky grounds, confine people to their homes for up to 12 hours a day,
limit their movement outside the home, and require them to check in at a
police station up to four times a day.125 Under French criminal law,
judicial authorities can impose assigned residence orders on individuals
where there are serious or consistent elements for suspecting that they
have committed a crime. However, under the current state of emergency,
a far less stringent standard is applied, allowing assigned residence orders
to be imposed at a ministerial level where "there are serious reasons to
believe that a person's [behavior] constitutes a threat to security and
pubic order."'126 Authorities allege that the individuals which these
measures target constitute a threat due to their supposed "radicalized"
religious practices or connections with other radicalized Muslims, but
despite the seriousness of these allegations, little evidence is presented to
substantiate such claims and most of the accused are not even given
access to the already inadequate evidence against them unless they file an
appeal against the order in court.
127
In one such case, a woman and her husband were accused of being a
part of an Islamist terrorist cell, subjected to a search of their home, and
then put under house arrest, simply because they were neighbors of a man
whom French authorities suspected of terrorism. They were ordered .to
check in three times a day at the local police station located eight
kilometers away from their home, forcing them to drive a total of 3,000
kilometers over the course of their house arrest. Nearly two months later,
an administrative judge suspended their house arrest, stating that "the
Ministry of the Interior impaired their freedom of movement in a grave
and manifestly illegal manner[.]" He also stated that the house arrest
order "lacked any specific factual element," implying that if judicial
authorization had been required, the order would not likely have been
granted. 1
28
123. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 10.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Abuses Under State of Emergency, supra note 117, at 4.
126. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 16.
127. Id. at 17 (For example, authorities issued an assigned residence order against a man due
to his "proven radicalization." To substantiate this claim they cited the fact that he had once
traveled near the town where some of the alleged perpetrators of the Paris attack lived and that he
had shaved his beard on the day of the attack.).
128. Abuses Under State of Emergency, supra note 117, at 6.
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Derogation measures must be strictly proportionate and must only
interfere with the exercise of rights "to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation." The measures instituted in France have far
surpassed the scope of this standard and cannot possibly be characterized
as necessary in handling the circumstances presented by the attacks. First,
there is nothing to suggest that the ordinary laws regarding the issuance
of search and assigned residence orders are incapable of meeting the
needs of the state. This is especially true given that there already exist
exceptions in France's criminal laws regarding terrorism-related
activities.'29 Second, in order for measures to be considered required by
the exigencies of the situation, they have to be suitable to reduce the threat
or crisis. Between November 14, 2015 and February 2, 2016, French law
enforcement officials conducted 3,289 searches and instituted between
350 and 400 assigned residence orders. 130 However, the fact that, of the
over 3,000 searches conducted by the police, only five instances resulted
in further investigation undoubtedly demonstrates that the measures
authorized under the state of emergency are grossly ineffective in
achieving their stated purpose.'31 Finally, even if the measures were in
fact effective initially, it is crucial that derogation measures remain
temporary. The exceptional nature of the measures which France has
instituted should be abating as less intrusive means become more
appropriate. What may have been necessary in the days or weeks
following the attacks are likely not as necessary months later, certainly
not to the extent that a renewal of the state of emergency was warranted.
Furthermore, both the ICCPR and ECHR require that even a
derogating state respect those rights which are non-derogable and remain
consistent with its other obligations under international human rights law,
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and
international customary law. France has failed in this regard as well. By
absolving the involvement of the judiciary in issuing search and assigned
residence orders, it has undermined the non-derogable principles of
legality and rule of law. In protecting the fundamental ideals of a
democratic society, it is critical that the executive branch remain subject
to checks and balances of power, as otherwise, as has been demonstrated
in France, the state is granted the opportunity to commit abuses.
Moreover, the use of over-broad and vague language such as "threat to
security and public order" injustifying such orders further contributes to
129. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 10 (for example, although French criminal law requires
that searches take place between the hours of 6am and 9pm, in cases of terrorism-related offenses,
searches may take place at night).
130. Id.
131. Abuses Under State of Emergency, supra note 117, at 3; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16,




Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol30/iss1/1
FIGHT OF THE CONDORS
a climate of abuse. Such wording fails to satisfy the requirement under
the principle of legality that all laws be written with sufficient
particularity and most importantly, it fails to give people adequate notice
of what actions are proscribed under the law. This has allowed police to
arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the emergency measures against
the Muslim community.
Although according to Jacques Toubon, the French Human Rights
Ombudsperson, these measures are not intended to target a particular
group, it is largely the Muslim community and persons of North African
descent which have been affected.132 As discussed in reports issued by
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the loose standards
with which the derogation measures have been applied have allowed
Muslims to be accused of "radicalization" on the basis of little more than
the fact that they openly practice their religion or are associated with a
mosque.'33 Not only does this violate the explicit non-discrimination
requirement of the derogation provision of the ICCPR, it is also a
violation of the non-derogable Article 18 right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. 134 As explicitly discussed by the Human Rights
Committee in General Comment 29, even in times of most serious public
emergencies, states that interfere with the freedom to manifest one's
religion must justify their actions under one of the permissible reasons
listed in Article 18, Paragraph 3; which France has not.
Finally, the imposition of assigned residence orders on the basis of
next to no evidence is certainly an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and a r
violation of the treaty law and peremptory norms of international 
law.135
Arbitrarily confining innocent citizens to their homes and placing
draconian restrictions upon their movements serves no legitimate state
purpose and is totally incompatible with the fundamental principles of a
free and democratic society which the international human rights
framework seeks to protect. The fact that those subjected to assigned
residence orders are not even made aware of the evidence against them
until just shortly before their appeal proceedings
136 implicates even
greater issues of the right to fair trial, which is also a non-derogable right
which can never be justifiably limited. The accused must be made aware
of the evidence against him and given ample time to seek assistance of
132. Abuses Under State of Emergency, supra note 117, at 2-3 ("All the measures that
Human Rights Watch documented targeted Muslims, Muslim establishments, or halal
restaurants.").
133. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 22.
134. See ECHR, supra note 10, art. 15 (though the ECHR does not explicitly include a non-
discrimination requirement in its derogation provision, such measures are invariably a violation
of Article 15 of the ECHR as well, as the ECHR impliedly enforces the non-discrimination
requirement of the ICCPR through its consistency requirement).
135. General Comment No. 29, supra note 34, 11.
136. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 16, at 20.
23
El-Rashed: Degrogation in Time of Emergency: An Analysis of Counter-Terroris
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNA TIONAL LAW
counsel if he is to be able to properly exercise his peremptory right to a
fair trial. The reasoning given by the authorities in trying to justify the
lack of evidence offered is troublesome in and of itself. Claiming that
these are "preventative"'137 rather than punitive measures is incompatible
with the principle of legality-particularly the fundamental right to a
presumption of innocence-as there can be no punishment without the
commission of an act which is proscribed by written law. The erosion of
such procedural guarantees serves little more than to weaken France's
human rights framework.
Assuming the circumstances following the attacks were of such an
exceptional nature that the French government was able to make the case
for the existence of a public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation,'3 8 it must still respect the strict guidelines which govern a valid
derogation and the measures which it allows for. France's failure to
comply with the principles of proportionality, consistency, and non-
discrimination has undermined the validity of its derogation and
constituted a clear violation of its human rights obligations under both
the ICCPR and ECHR, as well as its obligations under international
customary law.
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The deleterious effects of France's non-conforming derogation
measures on human rights standards and the rule of law are unacceptable
in the context of a purely legal analysis, however it is in the social and
political context that the truly damaging nature of France's disregard for
international human rights norms comes to light. Not only have the overly
broad and discriminatory measures proven ineffective in achieving their
stated aim of combatting terrorism, but there is reason to believe they
may in fact foster its spread.
At the core of any democratic society which claims a true rule of law
is the basic principle that all persons deserve equal treatment under the
law. Ethnic and religious profiling1 39 unjustly target certain persons and
clearly undermine this principle by stratifying society into two groups:
those who are innocent until proven guilty, and those who are guilty until
137. Id. at l6
138. MICHAELSEN, supra note 83, at 142 (As of 2008, the "majority of Council of Europe
states have not regarded the [actual terrorist threat] to be of sufficient gravity to meet the public
emergency which threatens the life of a nation criteria and have found enough flexibility in the
convention standards to accommodate any special provisions for counter-terrorism purposes.").
139. Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop and Search Practices in Paris, Open Society Inst.,
2009, at 19 ("Ethnic profiling is defined as the use by law enforcement of generalizations
grounded in ethnicity, race, religion or national origin-rather than objective evidence or
individual behavior-as the basis for making law enforcement and/or investigation decisions
about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.").
[Vol. 30
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proven innocent. In short, those citizens that matter and those that do not.
Though this may not be true, it is not difficult to imagine why targeted
communities may perceive it as such. This perception negatively impacts
public confidence in the police, not only for those directly affected, but
also for their family, friends, and associates,
140 and it makes it far less
likely that minority communities will cooperate with law enforcement.
This is a critical detriment to the police's ability to effectively combat
terrorism, as policing is profoundly dependent on the cooperation of the
general public to report crimes, provide suspect descriptions, and offer
witness testimony.14' In fact, without public cooperation, police rarely
identify or apprehend suspects, or obtain convictions.
42 This sentiment
is reinforced in the United Nation's counter-terrorism report, in which the
committee stresses that states do not have the resources necessary to
counter radicalization and deal with violent extremism on their own. The
committee calls on Member States to partner with civil society and local
communities in order to strengthen social cohesion and promote the trust
and transparency necessary to combat terrorism.
1 43 Promoting an alliance
of civilizations and an intercultural dialogue can significantly contribute
to countering the forces that fuel extremism and violence, as "economic
and social inequalities," whether real or perceived, "fuel discontent and
encourage grievances that create conditions conducive to the spread of
terrorism."144
Unfortunately, ethnic and religious profiling in France is not strictly a
recent spawn of the state of emergency, but rather a long-standing
systemic issue. In fact, A 2009 study by the Open Society Justice
Initiative and the French National Center for Scientific Research found
that in France, Arabs were almost eight times as likely as white people to
be stopped in pubic and frisked by the police.
1 45 Given the history of
discord between the Arab and Muslim community and the police, as well
as recent intensified ethnic and religious profiling under the state of
140. Dennis P. Rosenbaum et al., Attitudes toward the Police: The Effects of Direct and
Vicarious Experience, 8 Police Quarterly 343, 357-58 (2005).
141. Open Society Inst., supra note 139, at 23.
142. Rod Morgan & Tim Newburn, The Future of Policing xx Oxford Uni. Press (1997) (a
study in the United Kingdom found that of all recorded crimes solved, only 15 percent were
attributable to the police acting on their own and under 5 percent of crimes were solved using only
forensic evidence).
143. Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, First Rep. of the Working Group on
Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, at 6,
UN/CTITF (Sept. 2008).
144. Id. at 12.
145. Open Society Inst., supra note 139, at 21 (stating that in 2007, 2008, and 2009, several
French cities were overtaken by riots during which firearms were turned against the police,
including the Paris suburbs of Villiers-le-Bel, Grigny, and Les Mureaux; in the east of France,
Romans-sur-lsre, Vitry-le-Fran~ois, Saint-Dizier).
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emergency, it is not difficult to imagine the resentment and distrust that
may exist and the subsequent damage it may be causing to law
enforcement efforts. The discriminatory application of derogation
measures in France singles out the Muslim community and sends the
message that they are not subject to the same protections of the law as
their fellow citizens. Perhaps even more importantly, it is alienating the
community which law enforcement most needs the help of in identifying
and preventing future attacks.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Claims that the threat of terrorism was not contemplated in
development of the human rights framework and is therefore something
which it is not equipped to handle, are unfounded. In fact, the principles
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Charter were
established because of-not despite-the world's need for stability and
security in the face of atrocity.46 Furthermore, not only is there no
dichotomy between the state's duty to protect against terrorist acts and its
duty to uphold human rights, there is a direct correlation between the two.
In fulfilling its duty to uphold basic human rights within its jurisdiction,
the state has the positive obligation to take any and all actions which may
protect its citizens from the threat of terrorism. However, eroding human
rights protections, even in the face of extreme circumstances, undermines
the rule of law and promotes the conditions in which radicalization and
terrorism take hold. 147 Therefore, corollary to the state's obligation to act
in protecting its nation against the threat of terrorism, is its negative
obligation to refrain from actions which infringe upon its citizens'
fundamental human rights.
Though French authorities may feel justified in exceeding the scope
of allowable derogation measures in the name of protecting the greater
good, the arbitrary and discriminatory execution of measures which do
not conform with the derogation guidelines of the ICCPR and ECHR has
done little more than create a climate of anger and distrust. Muslims in
France are now more marginalized than ever and the threat of domestic
radicalization has only increased. If the aim of France's state of
emergency is truly to combat the threat of terrorism, it needs to re-
implement the rule of law and reaffirm its commitments to protecting the
human rights of all of its citizens. Failure to do so in the name of
promoting security is a self-defeating aim.
146. History of the Document, U.N. http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-
declaration/history-document/index.html.
147. DUFFY, supra note 18, at 275.
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